---
url: >-
  https://adk.nht.io/api/@nhtio/adk/batteries/llm/transformers_js/helpers/variables/llama3JsonToolCallParser.md
description: >-
  Parse bare top-level JSON tool call(s) — `{"name":"x","parameters":{…}}` (or
  `"arguments"`), optionally wrapped in a ```` ```json … ``` ```` fence (a
  common small-model emission — verified via the real-model matrix on
  Qwen2.5-Coder-0.5B). The weakest signal, so it is gated hard: after
  un-fencing, the output must be ONLY top-level JSON object(s) AND every callee
  must be a real tool (`ctx.toolNames`). Runs after every marker-anchored family
  in `'auto'`.
---

# Variable: llama3JsonToolCallParser

```ts
const llama3JsonToolCallParser: ToolCallParserFn;
```

Defined in: [src/batteries/llm/chat\_common/tool\_parsers.ts:882](https://github.com/NHTIO/ADK/blob/v1.20260713.1/src/src/batteries/llm/chat_common/tool_parsers.ts#L882)

Parse bare top-level JSON tool call(s) — `{"name":"x","parameters":{…}}` (or `"arguments"`),
optionally wrapped in a ` ```json … ``` ` fence (a common small-model emission — verified via
the real-model matrix on Qwen2.5-Coder-0.5B). The weakest signal, so it is gated hard: after
un-fencing, the output must be ONLY top-level JSON object(s) AND every callee must be a real tool
(`ctx.toolNames`). Runs after every marker-anchored family in `'auto'`.

## Remarks

**Parallel calls.** Small Llama-family / Qwen-Coder models emit MULTIPLE calls as several top-level
objects separated by `,` / `;` / whitespace (verified on the real-model matrix:
Llama-3.2-1B → `{…}; {…}`, Qwen2.5-Coder-0.5B → a fenced `{…},\n{…}`). So we string-aware brace-scan
the (un-fenced) text into successive balanced `{…}` objects, accepting only the separators above
between them — if any NON-separator prose sits between or around the objects, the whole thing declines
(the hard whole-output gate, so this never false-positives on JSON embedded in a sentence).

**Disambiguation, NOT authorization.** This parser is marker-free, so it must distinguish a tool call
from arbitrary JSON content. It does that STRUCTURALLY: whole-output-is-object(s) + each object has a
string `name`. It deliberately does NOT check the callee against `ctx.toolNames` — whether a requested
tool is *allowed* is the consumer's decision, not the parser's. An unknown-tool call is surfaced like
any other; the dispatch layer already replies "Tool not found: … Available tools: …" so the model can
self-correct. Silently dropping the call here would hide both the request and that feedback loop.